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I. INTRODUCTION
SAMUEL As indicated earlier, our luncheon program is a
THOMPSON: mock argument before a fictitious Delaware
(Moderator) Supreme Court consisting of you, our
audience, of an appeal of the Airgas case.6 In
Airgas, Chancellor Chandler of the Delaware
Court of Chancery upheld Airgas's poison pill.
First, let me introduce the person who will be
acting as the Chief Justice of the Delaware
Supreme Court, Stephen Lamb, sitting in the
middle, formerly a Vice Chancellor of the
Delaware Court of Chancery and now a partner
with Paul Weiss, where he focuses on
Delaware corporate law and governance issues.
Representing the appellant, Air Products, is
William Lafferty, of the firm Morris, Nichols
in Wilmington, who focuses on litigation
involving M&A, proxy contests, and
shareholder class and derivative actions. Bill
represented Air Products in the Chancery
Court. At Penn State, we are particularly
proud of Bill. He's a graduate of The
Dickinson School of Law, which has become
the Penn State Dickinson School of Law.
Representing the appellee, Airgas, is Kevin
Shannon of the firm Potter Anderson in
Wilmington, where he specializes in
shareholder class and derivative actions in
M&A and other complex transactions. Kevin
represented Airgas in the Chancery Court.
Chief Justice Lamb, I will now turn the time
over to you.
6. Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48 (Del. Ch. 2011).
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STEPHEN LAMB: Thank you, Sam. I'm going to give a very
(Presiding Justice) brief introduction of what the case is about and
then turn it over to Mr. Lafferty.
Air Products and Airgas are both Delaware
corporations. Both corporations are
headquartered in Pennsylvania and are in the
industrial gas business. Between October
2009 and February 2010, Air Products made a
series of purchase offers to the Airgas Board,
first at $60 per share and then at $62. Airgas
rejected each offer. Air Products followed up
on February 11, 2010, with a $60 all-cash, all-
share tender offer to the Airgas stockholders.
The Airgas Board recommended against the
offer as inadequate and refused to redeem its
poison pill.
The Board would adhere to these positions as
Air Products raised its offer in the coming
months. Under the Airgas charter, the board of
nine members was classified into three classes.
Air Products quickly announced its intention to
solicit proxies for a slate of independent
nominees to occupy three of those seats that
were up for election at the Airgas annual
meeting then scheduled for September 15,
2010.
Air Products' slate was duly elected. Air
Products also asked the stockholders of Airgas
at that meeting to vote on an amendment to the
Airgas bylaws to move the date of the next
Airgas annual meeting from September 2010 to
January 18, 2011, a mere four months after the
2010 annual meeting. That bylaw amendment
passed by a 52% majority of the shares voting.
Airgas then asked the Chancery Court to
declare the bylaw invalid on the theory that the
7. The following summarizes the Chancery Court's findings of facts. Id. at 59-91.
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Airgas charter required a vote of 67% of the
outstanding shares to approve a bylaw that was
inconsistent with the charter's classified Board
provision. Airgas argued that the bylaw was,
in fact, inconsistent because the classified
Board provision contemplated a full three-year
term for each class of directors, and that the
by-laws shift in the annual meeting date
shortened the incumbent's term by eight
months.
Chancellor Chandler ruled for Air Products,
finding the charter provision to be ambiguous
and able to be interpreted either to bestow a
full three-year term or to hold a term until the
third annual meeting after which you were
elected. Chancellor Chandler resolved the
ambiguity in the bylaws in the bylaws' favor
rather than in the charter's favor by reference
to an interpreted preference for the shareholder
franchise.
The Delaware Supreme Court reversed that
holding, agreeing with Airgas that the charter
provision was ambiguous, and agreeing with
the court in part, but finding that most charters
are drafted in the same way. The court took
notice of extrinsic evidence to the effect that
classified board provisions are generally
understood to import three-year terms-that is,
full three-year terms or nearly three-year terms.
Airgas and Air Products continued to negotiate
a possible combination while this litigation was
taking place. In November 2010, the Airgas
Board stated its position: the board wanted to
see $78 per share on the table for negotiations
to proceed. Meanwhile, the new directors
elected in September 2010 got up to speed, and
the board agreed to the new director's request
to hire a third outside valuation expert to give
an opinion and to hire their own legal counsel.
[Vol. 116:3814
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The company retained Credit Suisse as the
third banker.
Air Products then announced its highest and
best offer of $70 per share. The Airgas board,
including the three new members who had
been elected at Air Products' urging,
unanimously rejected this offer as inadequate.
It then remained for Chancellor Chandler to
rule on the Unocal or Moran9 question,
whether the Airgas Board's refusal to redeem
its poison pill was appropriate; that is, whether
the refusal was disproportionate to the threat
posed by the Airgas offer.
In a remarkable opinion, the Chancellor
sustained the Airgas board. The environment
was informationally rich, so there was no
chance that the shareholders would tender
under a misapprehension regarding the
company's value.'o
Still, the threat was found to lay instead in the
combination of an inadequate price and a
stockholder majority which, by that point,
consisted of arbitrageurs who were ready to
tender. The good faith board, the court held,
was free to maintain its defense.' 1 After this
decision, Air Products withdrew its offer.' 2
For the purposes of today's discussion,
however, they haven't withdrawn their
argument. Instead, Air Products has taken an
appeal to the Delaware Supreme Court. Mr.
8. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
9. Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).
10. Airgas, 16 A.3d at 104-06.
11. Id at 111- 13.
12. See Jef Feeley & Phil Milford, Air Products Drops Hostile Bid After Airgas Wins
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Lafferty will present argument for Air
Products.
II. ARGUMENT BY PETITIONER
WILLIAM Thank you. May it please the court, I'm
LAFFERTY: pleased to present argument today on behalf of
(Counsel for Air Products in the Air Products v. Airgas case.
Petitioner) On page 1 of his opinion, the former
chancellor13 framed the issue before the court
as follows:
Can a Board of Directors acting in good faith
and with reasonable factual basis for its
decision, when faced with a structurally non-
coercive, all cash, fully-financed tender offer
directed to the stockholders of the corporation,
keep a poison pill in place so as to prevent
stockholders from making their own decision
about whether they want to tender their
shares-even after the incumbent board had
lost one election, a full year had gone by since
the offer was first made public, and the
stockholders were fully informed as to the
target board's views on the inadequacy of the
offer?1 4
While the former chancellor correctly framed
the issue, I respectfully submit that he got the
answer to that question wrong, and I'm going
to turn to the two main reasons why I believe
that to be the case.
First, I respectfully submit that the chancellor
incorrectly applied Delaware law in concluding
that the power to defeat an inadequate, hostile
13. Former Chancellor William B. Chandler III left the Delaware Court of Chancery
in 2011, serving from 1989-2011. JUDICIAL OFFICERS OF THE COURT OF CHANCERY,
http://courts.delaware.gov/chancery/judges.stm (last visited Jan. 25, 2012).
14. Airgas, 16 A.3d at 54.
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offer ultimately lies with the Board. Second,
even if the Board does have such power to
defeat a tender offer, it can only do so after it
has affirmatively identified and investigated
the nature of the alleged threat and determined
that the continued maintenance of the poison
pill was a proportionate response to that threat.
The Airgas Board here did neither.
Now before I turn to those two points, I want to
step back for a moment and just put some of
this in perspective. The Delaware General
Corporation Law (the "DGCL") does not
regulate tender offers, nor does the DGCL
contemplate director action with respect to
tender offers at all. As explained by former
Chancellor Allen in the T W Services case,
tender offers, even when aggregated into a
single changing control transaction, require no
corporate action, and state law traditionally has
accorded directors no statutory role whatsoever
with respect to a public tender offer, even for a
controlling number of shares.' 5
Instead, a federal regulatory scheme governs
tender offers. The Williams Act requires
disclosure of information and requires directors
to make a recommendation on a tender offer,
but once they have disclosed information and
made a recommendation under federal law, the
directors' role is done.16
Now in the early to mid-1980's, we saw the
emergence of coercive, two-tiered, front-end-
loaded tender offers, a tactic used by corporate
raiders. Simply providing information and a
recommendation as the Williams Act requires
did not provide adequate protection from the
15. TW Servs., Inc. v. SWT Acquisition Corp., Nos. 10427 & 10298, 1989 WL
20290, at *1189 (Del. Ch. Jan. 31, 1989).
16. See 15 U.S.C. §78n(d), (f) (2010).
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structurally coercive offers of that era. Thus,
in response to those types of offers, boards
began adopting poison pills to delay or prevent
takeovers.
In 1985, this court, in Moran v. Household,17
sanctioned the use of a poison pill to respond to
a threat such as a two-tiered, front-end-loaded
tender offer, but it did so only with the
fundamental promise to stockholders that a
rights plan is not absolute and would not
prevent stockholders from receiving tender
offers, because a Board's decision to put in a
pill would be reviewed under Unocal8 and
would be subject to judicial review.1 9 And less
than a year ago, the Delaware Supreme Court,
in the Selectica20  case, reaffirmed the
fundamental promise from Moran that a pill is
not absolute.2 1 I will now turn to the reasons
why I believe the Chancellor misapplied that
promise.
Under Unocal, a board has the burden to show
a reasonable grounds for believing that a
danger to corporate policy and effectiveness
existed, and second, that the board's response
to that threat is neither preclusive nor coercive
and was reasonable in relation to the threat.22
The chancellor, in his opinion below, wrote
that his Unocal analysis came down to two
cases: the Paramount v.Time-Warner23 case
17. Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).
18. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985) (holding
that adoption of a defensive measure will be protected by the business judgment rule as
long as the board had reasonable grounds for believing that a danger to corporate policy
and effectiveness existed and the board's defensive response was reasonable in relation to
the threat posed).
19. Moran, 500 A.2d at 1354.
20. Versata Enters., Inc. v. Selectica, Inc., 5 A.3d 586 (Del. 2010).
21. Id. at 599.
22. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955.
23. Paramount Commc'ns, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990).
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and the Unitrin24 case. I'd like to take a look at
both of those cases briefly in light of some
other precedents that are out there: Interco25
and Chesapeake.
In the Interco decision-possibly the last case
where the court ordered a pill to be
pulled-Chancellor Allen was faced with a
similar factual scenario. Interco was defending
itself, using a poison pill, against a $74 tender
offer, and the board in turn was attempting a
restructuring that could result in a higher value
for stockholders.2 7 While Chancellor Allen
didn't use substantive coercion, which has now
become a common phrase, in his opinion, he
did identify the threat to the company as the
possibility that the board's financial advisors
were incorrect in how they valued the
restructuring plan, and that a majority of the
Interco shareholders may not accept that fact
and may incorrectly tender and be injured.28
In his opinion below, Chancellor Chandler
identified the threat similarly as the threat that
a majority of the stockholders-in this case,
arbitrageurs-might be willing to tender their
shares regardless of whether the price was
adequate. 29  Basically, that the stockholders
weren't smart enough to figure this out for
themselves.
The Chancellor expressed much skepticism
about whether this concept of a threat was a
cognizable threat under Unocal, and he stated
point-blank that he had a hard time believing
that an inadequate price alone in the context of
24. Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995).
25. City Capital Assocs. Ltd. P'ship v. Interco, Inc., 551 A.2d 787 (Del. Ch. 1988).
26. Chesapeake Corp. v. Shore, 771 A.2d 293 (Del. Ch. 2000).
27. Interco, 551 A.2d at 794.
28. Id. at 798.
29. Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48, 111-12 (Del. Ch. 2011).
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a non-discriminatory, all-cash, all-shares, fully-
financed offer could pose a threat-particularly
given the wealth of information that the
stockholders already had to make their
decision.30 Based on his reading of Paramount
and Unitrin, however, the Chancellor
reluctantly concluded that under existing
Delaware law, it apparently does pose a
threat.3 '
Your Honor, I share the Chancellor's
skepticism that an inadequate price alone can
constitute a valid threat, especially one that is
not time-limited. Our law presumes that
stockholders are competent to buy stock.
Unitrin itself presumes stockholders are
competent to sell stock into a stock repurchase
program.32 Our law further presumes that
stockholders are smart enough and competent
enough to elect directors. If stockholders are
competent to make those decisions, why does
our law deem them incompetent or too ignorant
to decide whether to accept or reject a
structurally non-coercive, premium offer? I
respectfully submit that our law should not
ascribe a rubelike quality to stockholders.
Even more troubling is that if an inadequate
price in and of itself is a continuous threat, and
as this court held in Unocal, directors have a
fundamental duty and obligation to protect the
corporate enterprise from harm that they
reasonably perceive, then directors would be
breaching their fiduciary duty by not using the
poison pill to prevent stockholders from
deciding on a tender offer that the directors
30. Id. at 56-57.
31. Id.at99-101.
32. See Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1372 (Del. 1995) (noting
stock repurchase programs, enacted outside of the context of defensive measures, are
reviewed under the business judgment rule).
33. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985).
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believe may be inadequate. In my opinion, that
just cannot and should not be our law.
But like the Chancellor below, I acknowledge
that, as our law presently exists, this form of
substantive coercion is a recognized threat in
Delaware. The question wherein I believe the
Chancellor erred is that: How can a Board
respond to that threat? I submit that the answer
is found in Chancellor Allen's decision in
Interco. There, Chancellor Allen ordered the
Board to redeem the pill, notwithstanding this
identified price threat, and specifically, in an
important part of the holding, Chancellor Allen
said:
To acknowledge that directors may employ the
recent innovation of "poison pills" to deprive
stockholders of the ability effectively to choose
to accept a non-coercive offer after the [B]oard
has had a reasonable opportunity to explore or
create alternatives or attempt to negotiate on
the shareholders' behalf, would, it seems to
me, be so inconsistent with widely shared
notions of appropriate corporate governance as
to threaten to diminish the legitimacy and
authority of our corporation law.34
Now, fast-forward 18 months after the Interco
decision to the Paramount case. It's important
to note that Paramount, which was so heavily
relied on by the chancellor, did not involve the
question of whether the Board ought to pull a
poison pill in response to Paramount's offer.
In Paramount, Time had entered into a stock-
for-stock merger agreement with Warner.
When Paramount came on the scene with this
blockbuster, all-cash tender offer, Time
amended its merger agreement with Warner in
34. City Capital Assocs. Ltd. P'ship v. Interco, Inc., 551 A.2d 787, 799-800 (Del.
Ch. 1988).
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a number of ways in order to defend its
transaction. Paramount sought to enjoin
Time's tender offer for Warner stock so as to
give Time stockholders a chance to accept
Paramount's bid.3 6
The Supreme Court in Paramount did discuss
the Interco case by Chancellor Allen briefly,
and it overruled a portion of Chancellor Allen's
opinion in Paramount. The portion of Interco
overruled in Paramount, however, dealt with
the forms of threat, or threats that may exist,
not whether the continued use of a poison pill
is a disproportionate response to a tender
offer.37
Indeed, the academic article upon which the
Paramount decision relies to support this
concept of substantive coercion38
acknowledges that the concept of substantive
coercion is a slippery, slippery concept, and
relies on the notion that recognizing such a
threat would be reviewed by a court under the
proportionality test of Unocal.39
After identifying a number of threats arising
from the Paramount tender offer, the court
there did apply a proportionality test, and the
court's proportionality analysis in Paramount
turned expressly on the fact that the revised
agreement and its accompanying safety devices
did not preclude Paramount from making an
offer for the combined Time-Warner
company.4 0 Such a holding is quite far afield, I
35. Paramount Commc'ns, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1144-49 (Del. 1990).
36. Id. at 1149-50.
37. Id. at 1152-53.
38. See id. at 1153 n.17 (quoting Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Delaware's
Intermediate Standard for Defensive Tactics: Is There Substance to Proportionality
Review?, 44 Bus. LAW. 247, 267 (1989)).
39. Gilson, supra note 37, at 274.
40. Paramount, 571 A.2d at 1154-55.
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submit, from binding the chancellor in this case
to conclude that the power to defeat a tender
offer ultimately lies with the Board.
Vice Chancellor Strine-now Chancellor
Strine-in Chesapeake, was faced with an
argument that substantive coercion from a
hostile bid justified the implementation of a
super-majority bylaw. Chancellor Strine, as
Chancellor Chandler did here, acknowledged
that the concept of substantive coercion is
binding precedent in Delaware, but went on to
note that the so-called "threat of substantive
coercion" could be invoked as a justification
for aggressive defensive measures and could
easily be subject to abuse.41
Chancellor Strine went on to discuss the
application of the second prong of Unocal, in
light of such a threat of abuse, as a method to
police such potential abuse of the substantive
coercion threat as an excuse for justifying
defensive measures.42 Chancellor Strine's
comments here were instructive. He said that:
One might imagine that the response to this
particular type of threat might be time-limited
and confined to what is necessary to ensure
that the board can tell its side of the story
effectively. That is, because the threat is
defined as one involving the possibility that
stockholders might make an erroneous
investment or voting decision, the appropriate
response would seem to be one that would
remedy that problem by providing stockholders
with adequate information. The corporate
[B]oard has, of course, many tools to
accomplish that, but may legitimately need
41. Chesapeake Corp. v. Shore, 771 A.2d 293, 327 (Del. Ch. 2000).
42. Id. at 327-29.
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43. Id. at 324-25.
more time to ensure that it could get its
message out to the marketplace.43
I respectfully submit, Your Honors, that
Chancellor Strine's analysis of the second
prong of Unocal in light of this concept of
substantive coercion being a threat is the
proper one that Delaware ought to follow.
Now briefly, let me turn ...
Mr. Lafferty, I know your time is almost up,
but how did it influence the chancellor's
opinion that the three directors that your client
caused to be elected basically drank the Kool-
Aid?
Well, I certainly think it did have an impact,
Your Honor, but I think in the wrong direction.
Well, why wouldn't it affect this court's
analysis as well?
I think I would say the following, Your Honor.
My point is that this concept of substantive
coercion that was relied upon here is one that
frankly is even further undermined by the fact
that three independent directors who were
nominated by my client actually joined the
other side. That actually supports the notion
that the stockholders have every piece of
information they could possibly need, and it
quite frankly undermines the notion that,
somehow, stockholders are going to make a
misinformed or misguided voting decision.
Well, that would be true except for the finding
by the chancellor that a majority of the
824 [Vol. 116:3





shareholders consisted of short-term traders
who would be more than happy to take $70,
even if $80 or $78 was the minimum adequate
44So, didn't the chancellor's decisionprice. Sdd' h hnelrsdcso
turn on his determination that the Board acted
in good faith?
I believe it did, Your Honor. At the end of the
day, I think he looked at what the Board did
and its process. I want to turn to one important
process point that was swept under the rug: the
proportionality review. The Board is obligated
to actually look at whether there is a continuing
threat and to actually make an assessment
about whether they ought to keep the pill in
place. Here, and Mr. Shannon will
acknowledge it-I believe he will have to after
two trials and around 40 depositions-there
was one mention of the pill ever at an Airgas
board meeting. The mention was an aside
made by one of the new directors, Mr. Clancey,
that "[w]e have to protect the pill."AS That is
the only time there was ever any discussion by
the directors about keeping the pill in place or
anything like it, and indeed, people commented
that they didn't even know what Mr. Clancey
was talking about.
I would also submit that the Board was
obligated to actually think about these things.
This notion about the arbitrageurs wanting to
maybe mistakenly tender, or tendering no
matter what the price was, was again not
something the Board can decide. They never
talked about that issue whatsoever. That was a
post-hoc justification thrown up at trial by
Airgas's expert.
44. Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48, 121 (Del. Ch. 2011).
45. Id. at 58.
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STEPHEN LAMB:
(Presiding Justice)
Thank you. I think your time is up. Mr.
Shannon?









Thank you, Your Honor. May it please the
court, I'm making the argument on behalf of
Airgas and its Board of Directors, which is
comprised overwhelmingly of outside,
independent directors, including, as Mr.
Lafferty pointed out, three directors nominated
by Air Products. The Airgas board, with the
advice of three independent investment
bankers, unanimously concluded that the $70
Air Products offer was inadequate. The Airgas
Board also unanimously concluded that the
company's defenses, including its rights plan,
should remain in place, and that Air Products'
inadequate offer should be resisted.
Mr. Shannon, what's the record citation, or
what's the citation in the chancellor's opinion
for the assertion that the Board of Directors of
your client actually made an affirmative
decision to retain the poison pill?
There are a number of citations. A number of
board presentations actually show the
percentage of shares held by arbitrageurs over
time. That issue that was repeatedly raised
with the Board; and the implications were
addressed with the board. In fact, as Mr.
Lafferty already pointed out, it was one of Air
Product's nominees, Mr. Clancey, who, after
hearing a presentation, including the
presentations by the three investment bankers,
said that not only was the offer inadequate, to
which all the investment bankers agreed, but
that the pill needs to be protected.46
46. Id.
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But was there ever a vote taken on that issue?
Did the Board of Directors of Airgas ever
actually, in a meeting, determine that in light of
their finding of inadequacy, that it was
incumbent upon them and part of their
fiduciary responsibility, to leave this poison
pill in place?
Your Honor has pointed out that the Board
determined repeatedly, based on good faith
investigation and advice, that the offer was
inadequate. Based on that determination, they
did not elect to redeem the pill. Whether they
actually made an affirmative vote on that, there
isn't a record, but clearly, what they repeatedly
determined, and what the court found ...
Well, your firm and Wachtell were advising
the Airgas Board, were they not?
They were, Your Honor.
So the fact that there is no reference in the
minutes to this happening, I take to mean that it
didn't happen. Am I wrong?
What happened was a determination that the
offer was inadequate, and they would not
facilitate it. Ultimately, Your Honor, that is the
question before the Court, and it may get lost
in the semantics. But the question before the
Court ...
Why is that the question? Why aren't the
directors obligated to make a decision about
whether, even in light of the finding of
inadequacy, it is not appropriate, or it would be
a breach of duty on their part, essentially, to
permit this offer to go forward?
2012] 827














In fact, Your Honor, that was the question
before the Court. Did the Airgas Directors
breach their fiduciary duty? Did they have a
duty to pull the pill in order to facilitate an
offer that they unanimously deemed
inadequate? Or as Mr. Lafferty would suggest,
did they have a duty at some point of time to
simply step aside and allow the Court to do
that? What they determined is that the offer
was inadequate and they did not pull the pill.
All right, I'll stop badgering you, but doesn't
Moran at least suggest that the directors have
an obligation at some point after an offer's
been extended to actually make an affirmative
decision to leave the poison pill in place, or not
to redeem it? The Board must have been asked
by Air Products to redeem the pill.
There was certainly a suit filed, and what
Moran says is the duty, and Mr. Lafferty
suggests as much, to keep the pill in place, or
the ability, is not absolute.47 And whether you
keep that pill in place will be evaluated under
Unocal, and what the court did was to evaluate
under Unocal whether they met that burden.
I gather there is no "resolution" in the minutes
of the Board in the last six months of this
transaction to the effect that, in light of their
findings and the conclusions they've reached,
that it is their judgment that the poison pill
should remain in place?
No, what you will see in the record is a
determination repeatedly that the offer is
inadequate and it should be resisted. Is there a
specific resolution that, "We shall maintain the
poison pill"? I have not seen that, nor is the
question before the Court whether there is a
47. See supra notes 16-20 and accompanying text.
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resolution stating that the directors will not pull
the pill. In fact, what the Board did is not pull
the poison pill after being requested because
they made a good-faith determination that the
offer was not adequate.
Apparently without discussing the
ramifications of the pill and its effect on the
offer. Was it even discussed after the three
new members were admitted? Was there a
discussion as reflected in the Board minutes of
the purpose of the pill and how the Board is
using it?
Well, I think it was very clear that the pill-
there was a suit outstanding.
That's not my question. I will leave you alone
to proceed as you want.
Ultimately, Your Honor, the question-and
Your Honor has already alluded to it-before
this Court isn't a broad, theoretical question,
but rather a specific question: Did this Board
breach its fiduciary duties? And the
question-as Your Honor has already
highlighted-is whether they have a duty,
having determined that the offer was
inadequate, to pull the pill, or, as I mentioned a
minute ago, whether they have a duty to step
aside and allow the shareholders to decide
whether and when the company would be sold?
And I will tell you that is not currently
Delaware law and nor should it be. Section
141(a) of the DGCL, to which Mr. Lafferty
referred, clearly vests the power to manage the
business and affairs of the corporation in the
hands of the directors.4 8 Van Gorkom makes
48. 8 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (West 2011).
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clear that the directors' duty is unyielding and
that they have an affirmative duty to protect the
shareholders.4 9
In Paramount, and Mr. Lafferty referred to
some of the Paramount holdings, the court
stated that, "The fiduciary duty to manage a
corporate enterprise includes the selection of a
timeframe for the achievement of corporate
goals. That duty may not be delegated to the
stockholders."50 The Court also explained that
Directors are not obligated to abandon a
deliberately conceived corporate plan for short-
term shareholder profit unless there is clearly
no basis to sustain the corporate strategy.
This was also addressed in Unitrin, where this
Court held that the Unitrin board had not only
the power, but the duty, to protect Unitrin
shareholders from an all-cash, all-shares offer
they deemed inadequate.5 2 The directors' duty
to protect the shareholders doesn't have a time
limit. The duty does not change because the
shareholders are informed or not informed. It
does not change because the shareholders are
sophisticated or unsophisticated. And most
important, the duty cannot be delegated to the
shareholders. There is no reason for this Court
to change that well-established law. As Mr.
Lafferty noted, the shareholders have a right to
elect directors. They do not have a right to
manage the company or force the Board to
engage in a sale.
STEPHEN LAMB: Mr. Shannon, Mr. Lafferty suggested that the
(Presiding Justice) upshot of this is that a board in your clients'
situation would breach its fiduciary duty if the
board, after concluding that a transaction was
49. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985).
50. Paramount Commc'ns, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1154 (Del. 1990).
5 1. Id.
52. Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1389-90 (Del. 1995).
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inadequate, either didn't institute or agreed to
pull a pill. Do you agree with that?
There's a very good argument for that, Your
Honor. From Van Gorkom, Paramount, and
Unitrin, the court has made clear that there is,
as I mentioned before, an unyielding,
unremitting, and affirmative duty to protect the
shareholders. And there is a very good
reason for that.
But does that extend to a duty to use a poison
pill to do that?
I think, Your Honor, that this is one of the
things that I'll point to the testimony of Air
Products' own directors. When Chancellor
Chandler asked them at trial, "If faced with an
inadequate offer, what would you do?" And
the director said, "I'd have to use every legal
mechanism available to hold out for the best
price."5 The poison pill is one of those
mechanisms that they would have to use.
There is a duty, an unremitting duty, to protect
the shareholders, and a board faced with an
offer they unanimously determined to be
inadequate based on the advice of three
independent bankers, has to follow that duty.
And there is a very good reason for that.
What if three of the nine didn't agree? Would
that change the fiduciary duties of the other
six?
Would it change? No, I think the directors
have to act in accordance with their fiduciary
duty. And, Your Honor, there's a very
important point here. When the directors are
acting, Mr. Lafferty and Air Products suggest
53. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
54. See Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48, 58 (Del. Ch. 2011)
(quoting Transcript of Supplemental Evidentiary Hearing at 104, id. (No. 5256-CC)).
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that the board should step aside and let the
shareholders decide. But in deciding whether
to accept or reject a tender offer, the
shareholder is deciding only one thing: Do I
want to sell my shares? They are not deciding
to sell the company. The shareholder can have
any number of reasons to sell their shares and
are making individual investment decisions
without any consideration of how their
personal decisions will affect the shareholders.
The Board, and only the Board, has a duty to
make the decision in the best interest of the
company and all of the shareholders. Only the
Board has the duty to maximize value if there's
a sale, and when the Board approves a sale, it's
approving a sale that will force out other
shareholders. That is a fundamental and
critical difference between allowing the
shareholders to decide whether and when to
sell the Company, and why Delaware law
always has vested that power in the Board.
It's really an exaggeration to say, "always
had," because this poison pill business didn't
start until the mid-80's. But would a Board be
breaching its duties if it adopted a pill that only
lasted six months?
If the Board restricted its ability to extend the
pill, certainly.
What if the board adopted a pill that said,
"Anyone who makes an all-cash, all-shares
offer with a minimum condition of two-thirds
of the shares being tendered does not have to
worry about the pill." Would that breach the
board's fiduciary duties?
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Yes, if the Board included in the pill that that it
didn't have the ability to exercise its fiduciary
duty and address the facts as they were
presented at the time.
And if that language is not included, just
saying, "This is the pill we adopt and this is
what it says." Is that a breach of fiduciary
duty?
I don't believe that would be a breach of duty
per se, as long as the Board had the ability to
revisit the pill if there were changes.
Quickturn would tell you that the Board can't
commit itself to do something in the future
without knowing the facts.ss
I'm not making any assumptions about what
the Board might do later if circumstances
changed. Just, at the time, would a Board be
entitled to adopt a pill of that structure?
A pill said that it will withdraw if 67% of the
shares are tendered?
No, rather that there will be no pill if there is
an all-cash, all-shares offer with a minimum
condition of two-thirds of the shares being
tendered.
Arguably, a Board could adopt such a pill, but
the Board would have to reserve the right to
amend it in the face of any change in
circumstances.
So why would that not be delegating the
decision about transferring the company to the
stockholders?
55. Quickturn Design Sys., Inc. v. Shapiro, 721 A.2d 1281, 1291-92 (Del. 1998).
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It's not because the Board is reserving the right
based on a ...
And if the circumstances don't change, the
Board doesn't exercise that right. The Board
left it up to the stockholders by a two-thirds
majority to decide whether or not to change
control.
In my view, if the Board had determined that
the offer is inadequate. The Board has a duty,
an unyielding, unremitting, and affirmative
duty to protect the shareholders.
If the Board determines the pill is inadequate, it
couldn't adopt a pill like I just described.
The Board would have to be able to show how
the adoption of the pill is consistent with their
fiduciary duties to the shareholders. And I
think the other thing you have to
recognize-the reason that a pill is so
important and so powerful-is that it forces a
bidder to deal with the Board. The Board, and
only the Board, is in the position to negotiate
effectively for the shareholders, with the pill
providing the negotiating power. The pill
forces the bidder to deal with the Board, and if
the bidder could unilaterally avoid the pill by
deeming its offer "best and final" or putting a
time limit on it, that would render the pill
essentially useless. That's why Chancellor
Chandler, after considering the extensive
factual records, expressly and correctly held,
that in order to have any effectiveness, the pill
does not and cannot have a set expiration
date, 56 which I think would get back to your
question. In theory, you could have a pill that
has limited powers, but I think the Board
56. Airgas, 16 A.3d at 129.
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would always have to reserve its rights to
protect the shareholders, and the law from Van
Gorkom has been consistent on that.
Your Honor-I know my time is up-in
conclusion, the Court of Chancery went
through the Unocal analysis. The court made
express factual findings that each of those
elements were satisfied. The court didn't
simply hold that the Board did not breach its
duties, the court held that this Board was the
quintessential example of the good faith and
compliance with fiduciary duties that are
expected of Delaware directors. In fact, Air
Product's own directors suggested that they
would do the exact same thing as Airgas's
directors.
There is no basis on this factual record and
established Delaware law to find that these
directors breached their duty. Nor should this
court change the law and hold that, at a point in
time, the Directors who are charged with
protecting the company and all of its
shareholders should simply step aside and let
the shareholders decide when and whether to
sell the company based on their own personal
interests, not the interests of the company as a
whole. For all these reasons, Your Honor, I
request and believe that the Court of
Chancery's opinion should be affirmed.
IV. REBUTTAL BY PETITIONER
WILLIAM I want to leave you with one parting thought. I
LAFFERTY: want to come full circle. The upshot of the
(Counsel for chancellor's opinion was that the power to
Petitioner) defeat an inadequate tender offer lies with the
Board of Directors. That holding comes in the
context of a federal regulatory scheme in the
Williams Act, whose stated purpose is to
require full and fair disclosure for the benefit
2012] 835
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of the stockholders, while at the same time
providing management an equal opportunity to
present their case.s? In this era of concern over
federal encroachment into state corporation
law-in the face of Sarbanes-Oxley and Dodd-
Frank-does this court really want to opine
that, in light of the stated purpose of the federal
regulations, that Delaware has nonetheless
placed the power to totally defeat a hostile
tender offer into the hands of the board? I
respectfully submit that it should not, and that
this Court should reverse the chancellor's
decision. Thank you.
STEPHEN LAMB: Thank you, Mr. Lafferty. We will now
(Presiding Justice) convene in chambers to take a vote.
57. See 15 U.S.C. § 78b (2010).
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